Private Equity’s Continuation Funds Surge Amid Exit Market Collapse: Valuation & Risk Wake-up Call

  • With traditional exits stalled, private equity firms are increasingly using continuation vehicles to sell assets to themselves, crystallize paper gains, and keep collecting fees.
  • These circular deals have surged to about $41 billion, or 19% of all PE exits in the first half of 2025, and are projected to exceed $100 billion for the full year.
  • High-profile blowups like Wheel Pros and United Site Services expose risks of inflated valuations, heavy leverage, and losses for limited partners and public pensions.
  • LPs and regulators are questioning governance, conflicts of interest, and whether continuation vehicles extend value creation or merely delay recognizing losses.
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The private equity sector is undergoing a structural shift. With traditional exit routes—IPOs, strategic M&A—stagnating under elevated interest rates and weak buyer demand, firms are turning to continuity strategies to unlock liquidity without external exits. Continuation vehicles (CVs) have evolved from a specialized option into a central mechanism in exit playbooks. [2][3]

From a financial engineering standpoint, CVs allow general partners to “sell” assets they own to a new fund under the same control, often at internally set valuations. This enables GPs to recognize paper gains, retain marquee assets, and generate fees from both fund vintages. However, this circularity raises the risk of inflated valuations, conflicts of interest, and misaligned incentives—particularly when assets later fail under market pressures. The collapse of Wheel Pros after being loaded with debt in its continuation fund is emblematic. [1]

Statistically, the trend is accelerating. In the first half of 2025, $41 billion in PE exits were executed via continuation vehicles, making up ~19% of all exits globally. This compares to about 13% in 2024 and only 5% in 2021. Projected full-year figures for 2025 are expected to exceed $100 billion. [2][4] LPs are cashing out far more frequently than rolling over stakes, signaling caution. [3]

Strategically, this means several things for different stakeholders: LPs must revisit diligence practices, asset valuation methods, and enforce governance rights. GPs may face pressure to justify continuation fund valuations to newer and older LPs alike. Regulators may begin to scrutinize whether CVs simply postpone losses rather than distribute economic value. For public pensions and systems under fiscal constraints, misperformance in CVs could exacerbate funding shortfalls. Moreover, the maturity wall—funds aging without exits—is causing a backlog that threatens capital inefficiency. [3]

Yet this shift also reflects opportunity: strong assets may benefit from longer hold times and more sustainable operational improvements rather than forced exit timing. Continuation funds align with LPs seeking lower-risk exposure to proven businesses. The key for GPs is maintaining credibility, rigorous valuation, transparency, and alignment of fees and returns. The balance between extending value versus merely delaying reckoning will be central to whether the trend produces lasting value or entrenches “rot.”

Open questions include: how independent are valuation and vote processes in CVs; how do returns on CV-held assets compare over 5-10 year spans; whether capital is being trapped; and what regulatory reforms are coming in response.

Supporting Notes
  • Continuation vehicles globally exited ~$41 billion in the first half of 2025, representing approx. 19 % of all PE sales, a ~60 % rise year-over-year. [2]
  • Projected exit value via continuation vehicles expected to hit ~$100-107 billion in 2025, up from ~$70 billion in 2024. [2]
  • In 2024, 96 continuation funds were recorded, making up about 13 % of all sponsor-supported PE exits; in 2021 that figure was just ~5 %. [3]
  • More than 50 % of all active PE funds globally are now six years or older, heightening pressure for exit options and fueling CV usage. [3]
  • Wheel Pros was bought by Clearlake in 2018, revalued at $2.3 billion via continuation vehicle in 2021, but went bankrupt in September 2024, wiping out many investors including public pensions. [1]
  • United Site Services, sold to a continuation fund by Platinum Equity, is in process of turning the company over to lenders and investors are expected to lose everything. [1]
  • LPs are choosing cash-out over rollover in CVs: in 2025, approx. 85-92 % of investors sold their interests rather than stay invested. [3]
  • Median multiple of invested capital (MOIC) for assets in continuation fund exits (~1.4×) is modestly higher than typical buyouts, with lower loss ratios reported. [3]

Sources

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