Feinstein, Allogene & the STOCK Act: What Her Blind Trust Really Protected

The principal fact emerging from the article—and corroborated by multiple sources—is that Richard Blum sold between $1.5 million and $6 million in Allogene Therapeutics stock in two tranches on January 31 and February 18, 2020, as senators were beginning to receive warnings about COVID-19. [2] [5] [8] This made the transaction part of a larger group of Senate stock sales shortly before market downturns tied to the pandemic. [8]

Critically, the price points of those sales—$21.72 per share on January 31 and $24.25 on February 18—were far from market highs, according to historical data. The stock would later climb above those prices before its steep declines, formally putting those sales near Allogene’s 2020 low in the weeks preceding broader market drops. [7] [1] This undercuts arguments that the trades were timed with peak prices, reducing but not eliminating ethical concerns dependent on timing alone.

Feinstein has publicly asserted that she did not direct or benefit from the transactions: her statement emphasizes that all her assets are in a blind trust, that the reported trades were made by her spouse without her input, and that the company in question was not linked to coronavirus response efforts. [4] [1] How those claims are verified is essential for assessing possible legal issues under the STOCK Act, which bans members of Congress from using non-public information for profit. [6]

From an investment banking and institutional perspective, the Allogene case spotlights several strategic implications. First, the optics of stock trades by public officials—or their family members—during periods of private briefings generate severe reputational risk. Second, blind trusts may not suffice in insulating elected officials from appearance of conflict, especially when stock movements correlate with classified or semi-classified information. Third, regulators might need to review whether enforcement or legislative refinements are required to ensure clarity in liability and transparency for transactions involving elected officials and their spouses.

Key open questions remain: Were any non-public briefings attended by Feinstein or delivered to Blum that could have influenced his decisions? Did the blind trust arrangement permit indirect influence? Has enforcement under the STOCK Act adequately addressed similar cases in the past, or does this represent a systemic gap? These questions affect not just this specific situation, but the broader status of congressional ethics, investor confidence, and policy prescription around insider trading and disclosure rules.